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Abstract
Since 1986, Government of Botswana has been running an Agricultural Credit
Guarantee Scheme for dry-land arable farming. The scheme purports to assist
dry-land crop farmers who have taken loans with participating banks or lending
institutions to help them meet their debt obligations in case of crop failure due to
drought, floods, frost or hailstorm. Nonetheless, to date, the scheme has focused
solely on drought. The scheme has placed an unsustainable financial burden on
Government because it is not based on actuarially sound principles. This paper
argues that the level of Government subsidies should take into account the gains
made by farmers during non-drought years. It recommends a quasi self-financing
mechanism that takes into account non-specific risks.
c© 2019, Machete
1 Introduction
In many countries around the world, the importance of agricultural produce is under-
scored by the efforts to establish insurance for this specific sector of the economy. The
USA, Germany, Italy, France and Spain are examples of countries that have established
Agricultural insurance. Agricultural insurance in these countries depends heavily in
government subsidies. The subsidies tend to be channelled towards premiums. Among
these countries, Spain is said to have the most developed system of agricultural insurance
that covers several risks (Colovic and Petrovic, 2014). In essence it provides a full-risk
coverage. It is noteworthy that increasing the number of perils covered will, inevitably,
increase the premiums.
Let it be noted, however, that the term agricultural is broad and includes many
perils that affect crops and livestock such as hail, floods, frost, etc. Drought is but
just one of these many perils that are grouped together under agricultural insurance.
When drought is frequent as is the case in the US, Spain and China, it is difficult if
not impossible to insure without Government subsidy. Some literature talks of yield
1Email: rmachete@bitri.co.bw, machete.r.l@gmail.com, r.l.machete@lse.ac.uk; Tel: +267-77610677.
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SEASON 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2014/15 2015/16
DRI P 205 M P 324 M P 77 M P 632 M
ACGS P 17 M P 22 M P 8 M P 244 M P 115 M
TOTAL P 222 M P 22 M P 332 M P 321 M P 747 M
Table 1: A sample of Government expenses following the drought seasons indicated. DRI denotes
Drought Relief Interventions and ACGS denotes Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme. The
ACGS amounts indicated were taken only through the National Development Bank. The amounts
taken through CEDA were not supplied.
insurance, which naturally includes drought insurance. In this paper we consider yield
to be a good proxy for drought and use it to make an empirical assessment of drought
in Botswana. It is preferred to rainfall because our analysis has shown rainfall to be a
poor index of crop yield. While there are other possible indices to consider, these also
fail to capture crop yield for dryland crops. In particular, it is difficult to detect any
correlations between yield for dryland crops and any of the indices.
Meanwhile, Botswana has had an Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme to manage
the agricultural drought that is specific to dry-land crops since 1986. Administered by
Government, this is supposed to be a multi peril insurance even though, since its in-
ception, it has solely covered drought following presidential declarations. Every year,
at the end of the harvest, a team of experts from various Government departments
travels around the country to perform drought assessment and subsequently make rec-
ommendations to Government. The team is referred to as an Inter-Ministerial Drought
Assessment Committee. Following the team’s recommendations, a national or regional
drought may be declared with relevant interventions to be implemented. The inter-
ventions entail two aspects: (i) Drought Relief Interventions and (ii) Contributions to
instalments for loans taken by arable farmers under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme. These interventions are performed only if a presidential declaration of drought
has been made. Drought interventions can include supplementary feeding for children
under 5 years old, employment of casual workers, construction projects, seed subsidy for
farmers with farms of up to 5 hectares, subsidy on selected cattle feeds, maintenance of
fire breaks.
A sample of Government expenses following drought declarations is shown in Ta-
ble 1. A number of observations can be made based on past drought declarations and
subsequent payouts. Most importantly, an analysis of the data indicates that, on aver-
age, drought is declared about twice in every three years and is thus a high-frequency
event. Moreover, there are extreme droughts such as that of the 2015/2016 season. It is
worth noting that such an extreme drought is a one in 35 year event. Irrespective of the
impact of the drought, we argue here that the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme is
not sustanable because it is not based on actruarial sound principles. In essense, Gov-
ernment may have unconsciously committed itself to highly subsidise dryland arable.
The level of cover it provides is not incosistent with contributions to the scheme. This
paper further argues that contributions should be specific to the crops planted in a given
season rather than just remain generic.
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2 How Insurance Works
It has been highlighted in the previous section that drought declarations are made 2/3
of the time and, after each declaration, Government spends millions of Pula on drought
relief interventions. A simple average of data on Table 1 suggests an average of around
P322 million per annum is spent by Government on drought interventions. This is surely
a lot of money that Government spends every year. It should be understood, however,
that any insurance company should charge not less than the Government’s average loss
per annum. Otherwise the insurer cannot remain solvent. In fact, the insurer should
charge more than the Government’s average loss to take into account administrative
costs of running the insurance.
What then is the value of insurance and how does it work? Insurance derives its
value from keeping expenses (in the form of premiums) fixed from year to year whilst
the insurance company takes the risk of fluctuating payouts. As defined by Mehr et al.
(1985), insurance is an instrument for reducing risk by combining a sufficient number
of exposure units to make their individual losses collectively predictable. Combining
several exposure units is called r isk pooling. What is the benefit of risk pooling then? An
insurer benefits from risk pooling in the sense that the law of large numbers insures that
fluctuations are reduced when the insured entities increase. Furthermore, the insured
can benefit from the law of large numbers through reduced administrative and buffer
load costs due to cost sharing (Wang and Zhang, 2003). The benefit of risk pooling is
not loss reduction but risk reduction!
Consider an insurer who receives gross premium P . The gross premium is the sum
P = Pn + L+A, (1)
where Pn is the net premium, L is the buffer load and A is the term for administrative
costs (Wang and Zhang, 2003). The buffer load term takes care of variations in claims
frequency and severity and it diminishes to zero as the pool gets larger. Each insured
contributes an amount equivalent to their average loss to the net premium and some ad-
ditional amount to the buffer load and administrative costs (Brown and Gottlieb, 2007).
It is important to note that the insured benefit from risk pooling through a reduction in
their contributions towards the buffer load and administrative costs. Risk pooling will
not and cannot reduce their individual contributions towards the net premium!
It might seem to some that the case of Botswana’s drought is markedly different
from the car insurance industry. In the case of car insurance, it would appear that
one contributes low premiums relative to the size of possible damages for which they
are covered. In fact, in Botswana, insurers typically charge premiums not more than
5% of the value of the car. Such a low percentage could be the one that inspired the
5% premiums charged under the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme. A fraction
consistent with the drought situation of Botswana should, however, not be less than
the horrifying 2/3 (or 66.67%). In contrast, why do insurers charge low percentage
premiums for car insurance? The reason is that the low percentages are consistent with
the risk that is underwritten. In particular, one should imagine that the risk of a car
being damaged beyond economic value is below 5% on average. In order to appreciate
this percentage, think of how rare it is that one gets involved in a serious accident.
Perhaps in your lifetime you have had no more than one or two serious accidents. Most
of the minor ones can typically be settled by excess1, perhaps avoiding the fines incurred
1Simply put, excess is the amount below which an insurance company does not issue a payout. In
3
when incidents are reported to the police. Bearing the foregoing issues in mind, can we
come up with a contribution plan that is acturially sound?
3 An Alternative Contribution Plan
From the past records, it could not be established which declarations were regional and
which were national. Therefore, we will assume that all declarations that resulted in
payouts were national because an overwhelming majority of declarations appear to have
been national. This assumption also aids tractability of the problem. We argue that
contributions should be specific to the crops planted in a given planting season and
consistent with the respective area planted. If there are J types of crops, we can let j
be the index for a given crop, with j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. In the subsequent discussions, ω will
be taken to be the frequency of drought declarations. Taking Υj(t) to be the yield for
the jth crop at time t, we can define the corresponding crop-specific drought threshold
to be µ
(j)
c such that
Fj
(
µ(j)c
)
= ω, (2)
where Fj(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the yield for the j
th crop. The
threshold may also be thought of as a prescribed coverage level. For a given crop, some
of the declarations might coincide with yields that are above the drought threshold,
µ
(j)
c . For that particular crop, the declaration of drought can be thought of as a false
declaration. This leads us to define the proportion of coincident (or ‘true’) declarations
to be
ψτj =
1
|Γ|
∑
t∈Γ
H
(
µ(j)c −Υj(t)
)
, (3)
where H(·) is the Heaviside step function and Γ is the set of times when drought dec-
larations were made. The proportion of declarations that are false is then given by
ψf = 1− ψτ . The proportion ψf gives an indication of how often farmers get financial
assistance when they should not. The crop-specific drought threshold need not cor-
respond to the frequency of drought declarations. It can be selected purely by other
considerations such as the yield potential of the specific crop. If selected by other con-
siderations, it leads us to define the crop-specific drought frequency as
ωj = Fj
(
µ(j)c
)
. (4)
The threshold µ
(j)
c can also be thought of as the pre-specified crop-specific coverage
level. Given that λj(t) is the price per hectorage, the crop will experience a production
loss amounting to
Lj(t) = λj(t)max
{
0, µ(j)c −Υj(t)
}
, (5)
which can be thought of as an indemnity payment for the specific crop. The distribution
of Lj(t) can be obtained from the truncated distribution of the yield, following which
we can obtain the mean loss E [Lj(t)]. The weighted loss for the cluster of crops is
Lθ(t) =
J∑
j=1
θj(t)Lj(t), (6)
actuarial language, this is called a deductible (Brown and Gottlieb, 2007).
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where θj(t) is the random variable for the proportion of area in which the jth crop was
planted. Moreover,
∑J
j=1 θj(t) = 1. The above model sees each individual loss as a
random variable. Consequently, the weighted loss experienced by the pool of crops is
also a random variable. The expectation of the weighted loss is thus given by
E[L(t)] =
J∑
j=1
E [θj(t)Lj(t)] (7)
=
J∑
j=1
E[θj(t)]E[Lj(t)] +
J∑
j=1
Cov[θj(t), Lj(t)] (8)
The variance of the weighted loss at year t is then given by
Var(Lθ(t)) = Var

 J∑
j=1
θj(t)Lj(t)

 (9)
=
J∑
i=1
J∑
j=i
Cov[θi(t)Li(t), θj(t)Lj(t)] (10)
=
J∑
j=1
Var [θj(t)Lj(t)] +
J∑
i=1
J∑
j=1,j 6=i
Cov[θi(t)Li(t), θj(t)Lj(t)] (11)
=
J∑
j=1
Cov
[
θj(t)
2, Lj(t)
2
]
+
J∑
j=1
E
[
θj(t)
2
]
E
[
Lj(t)
2
]
−
J∑
j=1
{
Cov [θj(t), Lj(t)] + E[θj(t)]E[Lj(t)]
}2
+
J∑
i=1
J∑
j=1,j 6=i
Cov[θi(t)Li(t), θj(t)Lj(t)].
(12)
If θi, θj , Li and Lj, where i 6= j, are pairwise independent, then the above formula
reduces to
Var(Lθ(t)) =
J∑
j=1
Cov
[
θj(t)
2, Lj(t)
2
]
. (13)
Setting
Z(t) =
L(t)− E[Lθ(t)]√
Var[Lθ(t)]
, (14)
we can approximate Z(t) by the standard normal distribution, meaning that Z(t) ∼
N(0, 1). In this case,
P
(∣∣Lθ(t)− E[Lθ(t)]∣∣ < 1.96√Var[Lθ(t]) ≈ 0.95 (15)
can be thought of as the probability that the fund set up to finance the scheme will not
be exhausted. Therefore, the buffer fund needs to be set at E[Lθ(t)]+2
√
Var[Lθ(t)] per
hectorage to maintain the probability of ruin at 2.5%. More generally, the fund should
be set to be
Fθ = A
(
E[Lθ(t)] + η
√
Var[Lθ(t)]
)
(16)
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where A =
∑J
j=1Aj and η is a parameter to be chosen to be consistent with the risk
appetite of the insurer or fund manager. In essence the η should be chosen to minimise
the probability of ruin.
It is important to measure the effect of using mixed farming to mitigate risk. Whether
or not mixing crops is effective as a risk mitigation strategy can be determined by as-
sessing how the variance of Lθ(t) compares with the weighted average variance of each
Lj(t). The coefficient of effectiveness can be used for this. If V denotes the weighted
average variance of the losses, then the coefficient of effectiveness is given by
φθ =
Var[Lθ]
E[V ]
, (17)
where
V =
J∑
j=1
θjVar[Lj]. (18)
Setting E[θj] = αj, it turns out that
E[V ] =
J∑
j=1
αjVar[Lj], (19)
from whence the coefficient of effectiveness becomes
φθ =
Var[Lθ]∑J
j=1 αjVar[Lj ]
. (20)
The lower the value of φt, the more effective the risk pooling approach. If θj is constant
for all j with θj = αj , then the above formula reduces to
φθ =
(∑J
j=1 αj(t)
2Var [Lj(t)] +
∑J
i=1
∑J
j 6=i αi(t)αj(t)Cov (Li(t), Lj(t))
)
(∑J
j=1 αjVar [Lj(t)]
) . (21)
If the losses are independent, in which case Cov (Li(t), Lj(t)) = 0 whenever i 6= j, then
the coefficient of effectiveness becomes
φθ =

 J∑
j=1
αj(t)
2Var [Lj(t)]

/

 J∑
j=1
αj(t)Var [Lj(t)]

 . (22)
In addition, if the variances are equal, then the formula for the coefficient of effectiveness
becomes
φθ =
J∑
j=1
αj(t)
2. (23)
Consequently, using the method of Lagrangian multipliers under uncorrelated risk, it
follows that φθ attains a minimum when αi = αj for all i 6= j, in which case the minimum
is φθ = 1/J .
The gain made from the jth crop in the year t, denoted by Gj(t), can be defined via
Gj(t) = λj(t)max
{
0,Υj(t)− µ
(j)
c
}
. (24)
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The total gain during a given season is
Gθ(t) =
J∑
j=1
θjGj(t) (25)
A payout to farmers should be made as long as Lθ(t) > 0, in which case the losses are
non-zero. Otherwise there should be no payout. The surplus for the jth crop in a given
planting season is then given by
Sj(t) = Gj(t)− Lj(t). (26)
If E[Sj(t)] ≤ 0, then the j
th crop is not insurable and should be removed from the
cluster of crops that are covered. In essence the crop makes no business sense. Without
loss of generality, we assume that each crop in the cluster satisfies the condition that
E[Sj(t)] > 0, implying that it makes business sense. The weighted surplus per hectorage
is
Sθ(t) =
J∑
j=1
θj(t)Sj(t). (27)
The expected surplus per hectorage is
E[Sθ(t)] =
J∑
j=1
E[θj(t)Sj(t)]. (28)
If E[Sθ(t)] > 0, then the cluster of crops makes business sense and may be insurable.
Note, however, that the condition that E[Sj(t)] > 0 does not guarantee that E[Sθ(t)] > 0.
In order to be given a loan and/or be allowed to take out insurance, it is necessary to
establish that the average surplus per hectorage is positive, i.e. E[Sθ(t)] > 0. In the
case that the proportion of hectorage planted is constant, i.e. θj(t) = αj , then
E[Sθ(t)] =
J∑
j=1
αjE[Sj(t)], (29)
where the linear property of the expectation operator has been used. Similarly, if θj(t)
and Sj(t) are independent for all j, then
E[Sθ(t)] =
J∑
j=1
E[θj(t)]E[Sj(t)]. (30)
Since the proportion of hectorage planted for each crop cannot be negative, it follows
that E[θj(t)] ≥ 0. Consequently, under the foregoing independence condition, it is
guaranteed that expected surplus per hectorage will be non-negative, i.e. E[Sθ(t)] ≥ 0,
which implies that the cluster of crops makes business sense and is thus insurable.
Each crop-specific threshold may be chosen to be the minimum required for prof-
itability, having taking into account production costs (including all seasonal inputs) for
a given season. In the instance of self-insurance, one would use the surplus to take care
of the years of want. In the absence of annual loan instalment obligations, self-insurance
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is possible if and only if E[Sθ(t)] ≥ 0. In this case, the farming is profitable. Given that
the loan instalment per area planted per season is l, it is important to have E[Sθ(t)] > l
to be able to use the proceeds of farming to service the instalments. Without insurance,
the amount left after paying instalments is
R = E[Sθ(t)]− l. (31)
If the frequency of drought declarations is ω, then the average amount paid towards
instalments per season is
l1 = (1− ω)l + pωl, (32)
where (1 − p) is the insured benefit level, with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Denoting the premium rate
by γθ, the amount of premium paid to take out insurance is γθl, the portion of surplus
left after making payments towards instalment and premiums is
R1 = E[Sθ(t)]− (1− ω)l − pωl − γθl. (33)
Note that ω can be chosen to be consistent with a specific collection of crops. The pre-
mium contributions and subsidies may be set to reflect both the frequency and severity
of the drought events. In order for the farmer to remain solvent, it is important to have
R1 > 0. This condition translates to the inequality
(γθ + pω) <
E[Sθ(t)]
l
− (1− ω). (34)
An actuarially sound premium level should satisfy the equation
γθ = ω(1− p). (35)
When premiums are actuarially sound, inequality (34) reduces to the requirement that
E[Sθ(t)] > l. What happens if actuarially sound premiums lead to insolvency, i.e. R1 ≤ 0
or equivalently E[Sθ(t)] ≤ l? In this case, under the condition that E[Sθ] ≥ 0, there
is justification for Government subsidy and the rate that cushions the farmer against
insolvency is
κθ ≥ 1−
E[Sθ(t)]
l
. (36)
The farmer’s premium rate should then be set to
γθ = ω(1− p)− κθ. (37)
Equation (37) imposes an additional condition on the subsidy κθ, which condition is
that κθ < ω(1 − p). This condition insures that the premium rate γθ remains positive.
If E[Sθ] < 0, then this is a case for full Government subsidy and Government should
pay the actuarially sound rate of κθ = ω(1−p). In the special case when θj = 1/J , then
the corresponding variables and the parameters become φ, L(t), G(t), γ, κ, S(t), etc.
4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we consider the potential benefit of drought management through plant-
ing multiple field crops, applying the theory from the previous section. This approach is
a form of risk pooling strategy. In order to apply the theory from the previous section,
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Figure 1: Graphs showing the (left) revenue per hectare for the three field crops, sorghum, maize
and cow-peas and (right) the total instalments paid towards arable farming loans.
we consider three field crops, Sorghum, Maize and Pulses that are planted in Botswana.
The data for these crops dates from 1979 to 2003 and was obtained from the Ministry of
Agriculture. This study considers commercial farming and focuses on the variables, area
planted in hectares and crop yield in terms of Kilograms per hectare. In order to plant
these crops, farmers can take loans from participating lending institutions. The loans
are subject to annual instalments. When they take the loans, they are also required to
take out insurance offered through the agricultural credit guarantee scheme.
In order to benefit from the scheme, each farmer pays 5% of the instalment towards
an insurance premium whilst the lending institution contributes 5%. In total, 10% is
paid as an insurance premium. An analysis of claims data from the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development indicates that payouts from the scheme were made 2/3 of the
times, which implies that the probability of drought is ω = 2/3. The contribution of 10%
entitles the insured (who is the farmer) to a cover of up to 85% of his annual instalment
if a drought is declared. According to Equation (35), a corresponding actuarially sound
premium rate is 56.7% of the instalment. The premium rate is actuarially sound as long
as the insured benefit level is exactly 85% and not less. Equation (35) applies when the
insured benefit level is exactly (1− p).
Since insurance requires an understanding of the revenue that proceeds from these
crops, yield time series for these crops can be multiplied by costs per kilogram to ob-
tain revenue per hectare. Using the variables from the previous sections, we want to
obtain a time series plot of λj(t)Υj(t), where Υj and λj are the yield and price per per
hecatare respectively, for the jth crop in the cluster. In order to obtain the variations
in revenue over time, having taken inflation adjustments into account, 2016/2017 prices
from Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) were used. Using those values
allows comparison with estimates of farm input costs provided by the Department of
Crop Production. The graphs for Maize, Sorghum and Cow peas are shown in Figure 1.
The three straight lines indicate the corresponding estimates of farm input provided by
the Department of Crop Production. These costs have been heavily subsidised under
ISPAAD, Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agricultural Development. The
colour of each straight line matches that of the corresponding crop. According to these
graphs, the revenue for each crop is always (except once for maize) lower that the cost
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Figure 2: Graphs showing the (left) expected profit per hectare for the three field crops, sorghum,
maize and cow-peas and (right) the coefficient of effectiveness.
of inputs. This implies that the farming of the respective crops is generally operated
at a loss. If these estimates are accurate, then the the farming of these field crops re-
quires subsidy every year in order to be sustained. Giving partial financial assistance
only during the years of national drought declarations cannot suffice. Nonetheless, these
estimates of farm inputs are doubtful because farmers have remained in business under
the current arrangement of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme.
An alternative way of setting up a loss threshold is to use the percentage of drought
declarations as discussed in the previous section. Using data for commercial farming
at a national level, graphs of the profit obtained under varying values of probability of
drought are shown in Figure 2. Figure two contrasts the two ways of producing profit per
hectare which are encapsulated by E[Sθ] and E[S]. E[Sθ] is an expectation that takes into
account the proportion of area planted for each crop whilst E[Sθ] is a simple expectation
that does not take those proportions into account. On the right hand of the figure are
graphs of the coefficient of effectiveness based on the two methods of computing the
average profit per hectare. On the graphs, φθ is the coefficient of effectiveness obtained
when the expectation is weighted by the proportion are for each graph whilst φ is
the coefficient obtained when the proportions are not taken into account. Recall that
the lower the coefficient of effectiveness, the more effective the risk pooling approach.
According to these graphs, area weighting is a more effective risk pooling approach than
simple averaging of revenue per hectare as the probability of drought increases. In what
sense is the area weighted approach more effective? It leads to lower variations in the
fund due to claims, thus reducing the probability of ruin.
To assess what premium rate should be paid by farmers subject to Government
subsidy, one should consider Figure 3. The algorithm upon which the figure is based
was derived in the previous section. The loan instalment per area planted was computed
based on an average of instalments paid and area planted for the past 10 years. The idea
is that one should use a moving average to account for climate change. The choice of the
length of time over which to compute the average annual instalment per hectare is based
on no hard rule, except that we suggest using a time period that is less than climate
time scales. In producing the graphs, the value of instalments used was l = P1008/Ha.
Here, the farmer’s premium rate is γ (or γθ) whilst the Government subsidy is κ (or κθ),
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Figure 3: Graphs of premium rate versus probability of drought. In the graphs, γ (or γθ) is the
rate that the farmer should pay subject to a government subsidy of κ (or κθ).
where the subscript θ distinguishes the area weighted approach from the simple average
method. According to the graphs in Figure 3, the threshold for Government intervention
with subsidy is much lower for the area weighted method as compared to the simple
average method. In the area weighted approach, these is need for Government subsidy
when the probability of drought reaches ω ∼ 12% and there is need for full subsidy just
before it crosses the 20% threshold. The threshold for Government intervention is much
higher in the simple average approach, being ω ∼ 25% and full subsidy is required when
the probability of drought is around 33%. Both suggest that the current rate of drought
declarations merits full subsidy on seasonal loans.
5 Discussion
This paper sought to investigate the possibility for Government of Botswana to setup
a fund to finance annual instalments for dry-land arable farming in times of drought.
It notes that, at the moment, there is no fund setup to assist farmers who have taken
loans with participating banks. If available, loss data can be used to determine what
the size of the fund should be. The fund should be setup to minimise the probability of
ruin by an aggregate loss that is large enough to do so. In this report, it is suggested
that yield data for insurable crops provides a good proxy for loss data. Whilst there is
no one way for setting the threshold that determines losses and gains, for a start, past
records of drought declarations can be used to set the thresholds. Each crop should then
have threshold consistent with the probability of drought. The thresholds are then used
to determine the financial losses corresponding to the yield shortfalls. The fund should
then be setup to be equivalent to the area weighted losses for the several crops within an
insured cluster. The concept of using the area weighted losses is supported by results of
the empirical example considered in this paper. the said fund is meant to assist farmers
who have taken out loans with participating banks to pay instalments in years of poor
yield or crop failure. If a drought has been declared, their instalments should be paid
off through funds from the scheme and this paper argues that these funds need not and
should not be sought in an adhoc manner.
It should be understood that for farmers to benefit from the scheme they should
11
each pay a premium that is actuarially sound. The current status quo is that all farmers
pay a flat rate regardless of what crops they are growing. This papers argues that a
more prudent approach is to set rates that are crop specific and it provided an algo-
rithm that also determines an appropriate Government subsidy for each cluster of crops
under consideration. As an empirical example, a cluster of field crops comprising Maize,
Sorghum and Cow Peas was considered. It was found that when the probability of
drought exceeds 45%, yield data at a commercial scale indicates a lack of profitability.
This finding was independent of the method of weighting used and seems in conflict with
the fact that farmers still remain in business when, according to national declarations,
the probability of drought is about 2/3 (∼ 67%). An actuarially sound premium rate
consistent with this probability of drought at an insured benefit level of 85% is 56%, but
the contribution from both farmer and the lending institution is amounts to only 10%.
This implies a Government contribution to the premium rate that is equivalent to 46%,
which is not a full subsidy rate. This subsidising rate still wouldn’t be sufficient to keep
the farmers in business. Interestingly, the situation is even worse when one considers
farm inputs that have been heavily subsided by ISPAAD. The search for the catch is
critical to unravelling this important topic. It seems very likely that the blanket national
drought declarations are flawed in their relation to arable farming. There is need for a
thorough review of the applicability of national drought declarations to arable farming.
It is important to note that, whereas the payment of a premium of 10% entitles
the farmer to a variable benefit level of up to 85%, the reality is that Government has
invariably paid out a fixed rate of 85%. There is, therefore, a need to vary the benefit
level according to severity. The effect of varying the severity is a subject for further con-
sideration. To avoid the problem of moral hazard and asymmetrical information, remote
sensing information may be used to assess severity so as to determine an appropriate
payout. This will be an important question to address. Finally, this paper considered
risk pooling by mixing different field crops, A straight forward variation is to consider
mixing that approach with a spatial distribution approach. The methodology presented
in this paper can directly be applied to this scenario to determine its efficacy.
6 Conclusions
This paper argued for mixing field crops as a drought mitigation strategy and presented
a methodology that is applicable to any chosen cluster of dry-land crops. It presented a
way for Government to setup a drought fund for dry-land arable farming. An algorithm
for setting up premium subsidies was presented and tested with numerical example. In
here was also presented empirical evidence that national drought declarations are not
consistent with yield data for the main field crops.
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